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INTRODUCTION

Although ERISA preemption was ranked among the top "eight pertinent
issues"' that needed to be addressed in order to achieve comprehensive health care
reform, Congress opted to avoid it when it passed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Health Care Act2 on March 23, 2010, and the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act3 just one week later ("PPACA" or the "Act",
collectively). Currently 180 million Americans receive employer-sponsored health
benefits, and millions more will do so once PPACA takes full effect over the next
few years. This expansion of employer based coverage, coupled with what the Act
does and does not do regarding the role of employers, makes ERISA preemption
potentially more problematic than ever. Thus, to accomplish meaningful
improvements in how employer-sponsored health benefits are financed and
delivered, Congress must tackle ERISA preemption of state "play or pay" laws if it
expects to improve instead of simply expand and exacerbate existing problems with
employer coverage.
The evolution of employer-sponsored health insurance and the pros and cons
of "play or pay" mandates have been ably recounted elsewhere and will not be
revisited here.4 What warrants further consideration is why employer mandates
have been so difficult to implement at the state level. Obviously, there are
numerous reasons for this, with fears of employer exodus from a state, lower
wages, higher prices and job losses among them.5 Beyond the economic factors,
though, lies a significant legal obstacle: ERISA preemption of state law. Spanning
three decades and growing more complex with each year, ERISA preemption
jurisprudence is often mentioned, but rarely explained in the context of employer
mandates. 6 Such confusion is likely to intensify with PPACA's passage since the

1. E.g., PETER D. JACOBSON, O'NEILL INST. FOR NAT'L & GLOBAL HEALTH LAW, THE ROLE OF
ERISA PREEMPTION IN HEALTH REFORM: OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITS, at iii (2009), available at

http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/39410.erisa.finall.pdf (describing ERISA preemption as one of the
"eight pertinent issues" that must be addressed in any significant health reform proposal).
2. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
3. Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
4. See, e.g., David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United StatesOrigins and Implications, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 82-84 (2006) (describing the history of employersponsored health insurance); Alan C. Monheit & Pamela Farley Short, MandatingHealth Coveragefor
Working Americans, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1989, at 22, 23-25 (discussing the benefits and criticisms of
employer-based insurance mandates).
5. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. CHOW & BRUCE D. PHILLIPS, NAT'L FED'N OF INDEP. Bus., SMALL
BUSINESS EFFECTS OF A NATIONAL EMPLOYER HEALTHCARE MANDATE 2, 16 (2009), available at

(identifying
https://www.nfib.com/Portals/O/PDF/AllUsers/NFIBStudy-HealthcareMandate.pdf
increased costs, layoffs, and even closure as risks businesses may face under an employer mandate
program).
6. E.g., PATRICIA A. BUTLER, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., FACT SHEET: ERISA IMPLICATIONS
FOR

STATE

PAY

OR

PLAY

LAWS

(2007),

available

at
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Act includes an employer "play or pay" incentive, but is silent regarding the
continued viability of existing state and local "play or pay" measures that require
something more or different of employers in providing health benefits for their
workers.
With the goal of explaining how to head off a collision of PPACA and
ERISA, this Article begins with an analysis of PPACA's treatment of employer
responsibilities, 7 followed by a review of the mechanics of ERISA preemption.8 It
next examines recent state and local efforts to enact employer mandates and their
mixed success in surviving ERISA preemption challenges, particularly those of
Maryland, Massachusetts, and San Francisco. 9 Finally, an evaluation of PPACA's
potential

impact

on ERISA preemption

of state

"play

or

pay" provisions

demonstrates why Congress must clarify the interaction of PPACA and § 514 of
ERISA with regard to the intended role, if any, of state or local employer mandates
in national reform.

I°

Anything less perpetuates a major, but poorly understood

obstacle to meaningful reform despite all that Congress accomplished in enacting
PPACA.

I. EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY UNDER PPACA

Enacting significant legislative reform in the United States can involve years
of extended debate and substantial compromise. However, it took decades of failed
attempts before Congress passed PPACA. The final push proved especially
contentious with charges of government takeovers 2 and death panels 13 diverting
the spotlight from one typical lightning rod of controversy: the use of employer

http://calhealthreform.org/pdf/ERISAfactsheetButIerP.pdf (showing uncertain views regarding how
ERISA affects "play or pay" laws); but see Timothy S. Jost, Health Care Reform Requires Law Reform,
28 HEALTH AFF. w761, w762-63 (2009), http://content.healthaffairs.orglcgi/reprintI28/5lw761
(discussing the areas in which ERISA preempts state law).
7. See infra Part 1.
8. See infra Part 1I.
9. See infra Parts III-V.
10. See infra Part VI.
11. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, Remarks by the
President to a Joint Session of Congress on Health Care (Sept. 9,
2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the.-press-Office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-a-Joint-Session-of-Congresson-Health-Care (imploring Congress to enact health care reform legislation); CNNPolitics.com, Obama
Resumes Health Care Push, Vows to 'Get It Done This Year' (Sept. 27, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/26/obama.health/index.html.
12. See, e.g., Matt Spetalnick, Reuters, Healthcare Critics Make Outlandish Claims: Obama (Aug.
8, 2009), http://www.reuters.comlarticle/idUSN0742097620090808 ("Republicans call [Obama's push
for healthcare reform] a government takeover of healthcare .... ").
13. See Jim Rutenberg & Jackie Calmes, False 'Death Panel' Rumor Has Some Familiar Roots,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/14/health/policy/
14panel.htmI (describing allegations that Obama's proposals for health care reform would result in
government-sponsored "death panels").
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"play or pay" provisions to expand coverage and spread cost. 14 Typically, such
"shared responsibility" measures either mandate or incentivize employers to "play"
by sponsoring employee health benefits or "pay" via a "fair share" contribution
(usually a tax or flat fee) to cover the uninsured in general or its own uncovered
workers. 5
Prior to PPACA's enactment, the federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) permitted an employer to do neither. 16 Whether this would
change was a major point of disagreement between the two chambers of Congress.
The House of Representatives' Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R.
3962), 17 passed with a narrow margin of 220 to 215,18 and required employers with
annual payrolls exceeding $500,000 to "play" by contributing 75.2% to employees'
individual coverage or 65% to family coverage,' 9 or "pay" a payroll tax ranging
from 2% to 8%, depending on the amount of that payroll. 20 By a vote of 60 to 39
along party lines, 21 the Senate voted to consider an amendment to the House bill
(S.Amdt. 2786), which would have omitted the overt mandate that existed in the
House measure.22 However, it did impose a substantial incentive in the form of a
$750 "free rider" penalty that would be triggered when an employee of a large firm
23
obtained federally subsidized coverage.
As Congress wrestled with this and the literally countless details of national
reform, the business community displayed mixed reactions to an employer
mandate. The National Retail Foundation viewed any "play or pay" scenario as

14. See Monheit & Short, supra note 4, at 23 (describing employer mandates as a subject of
continuing controversy).
15. See Jeanne Sahadi, CNNMoney.com, Health Care: Will 'Pay or Play' Chase Employers Away?
(July 2, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2O09/07/O2/news/economy/health-reform (explaining the latest
iteration of a "play or pay" proposal that was included in a Senate proposal).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006).
17. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 11 lth Cong. (2009).
18. 155 CONG. REc. H12,598, H12,967-68 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009). That most House Democrats
supported and most Republicans opposed H.R. 3962 in general and the employer mandate in particular
is nothing new. Employer mandates provoked a similar split during the Clinton administration's
unsuccessful health reform initiative. Roger Thompson, Support Wanesfor Employer Mandate-Health
Care Reform Policy, NATION'S BUS., Aug. 1994, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/
mi_ml 154/isn8_v82/ai_15637930. The House Ways and Means Committee approved an employer
mandate by a 20 to 18 vote, but not one Republican voted for it. Id. Once the Republican Revolution
regained congressional control in November 1994, the employer mandate as well as health reform in
general fell off the legislative agenda. See MARK E. RUSHEFSKY & KANT PATEL, POLITICS, POWER &
POLICY MAKING: THE CASE OF HEALTH CARE REFORM INTHE 1990S 108 (1998) (indicating that in
September 1994, Senate Majority Leader Mitchell declared the health care bill was dead).
19. H.R. 3962 § 412(b)(I)(A)-(B).
20. Id. § 413(a)-(b).
21. 155 CONG. REC. S13,834 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2009).
22. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, S.Amdt. 2786, 111 th Cong. (2009).
23. Id. sec. 1513, § 4980H(a)(1), (d)(l).
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"catastrophic" and "devastating. 24 The National Federation of Independent
Business opposed the imposition of significant costs on employers, especially small
ones, at a time when unemployment was at a twenty-five-year high and the
economy continued to struggle, despite the government's insistence that the
recession was over.25 Republicans tended to agree,26 with Senator Orrin Hatch
calling such measures "job killing.

' 27

Yet, a struggling economy,

28

growing health

29

care cost pressures and shrinking coverage actually made "shared responsibility"
more palatable for some employers, as evidenced by Wal-Mart's dramatic shift
from vehement opponent to staunch supporter. 30 Thus, by the close of 2009, the
lack of strong consensus in the political and business sectors indicated that H.R.
3962's "play or pay" provision could change considerably, or disappear entirely
during the process of reconciliation and a full vote of both houses.31
With PPACA's passage, however, "play or pay" lives on, albeit in still
another permutation. Technically, it is not a true "mandate" since it does not
require health-related payments in every instance (unlike the House's original
unconditional insistence that employers sponsor benefits or pay additional taxes).
Rather, the Act encourages employers to "play" through conditional "pay"
penalties that only attach in certain circumstances. As such, it is more aptly
characterized as an incentive than a mandate, although the term "employer
mandate" is often applied to both strategies.
Specifically, PPACA's version of "play or pay" will take effect in 2014 and
covers "applicable large employers" who employed 50 or more full-time

24. Letter from Tracy Mullin, Pres. & CEO, Nat'l Retail Fed'n, to members of the Nat'l Retail
Fed'n (July 13, 2009), available at http://www.nrf.com/modules.php?name=Documents&op =
viewlive&sp-id=3358.
25. Susan Eckerly, Nat'l Fed'n Indep. Bus., NFIB Statement: Senate Health Bill (Nov. 19, 2009),
http://www.nfib.com/issues-elections/issues-elections-item/cmsid/50237.
26. See John Boehner, The GOP's Job Creation Plan, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2009, at A29
(describing Republican opposition to increasing costs to employers).
27. FOXNews.com, Will Democrats Go at It Alone on the Health Care Bill? (Aug. 20, 2009),
http://ww-w.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,540941,00.html.
28. See Eric Dash & Vikas Bajaj, In 2009, Economy Will Depend on Unlocking Credit, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at BI (describing the continuing effect of the 2008 financial crisis on the current
economy).
29. E.g., Lisa Girion, HealthcareCosts Pinch Employers: Study Suggests That ManufacturersHave
Limited Resources to Offset Rising Fees, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2008, at C3.
30. Letter from John Podesta, Pres. & CEO, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Andrew L. Stem, Pres., Serv.
Employees Int'l Union, & Mike Duke, Pres. & CEO, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., to President Barack Obama
(June 30, 2009), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/walmart-letter_
063009t.pdf.
31. Compare CHOW & PHILLIPS, NAT'L FED'N OF INDEP. BUS., supra note 5, at 2, 16 (describing
how an employer mandate will harm the economy in general and small businesses in particular), with
Thomas C. Buchmeuller & Alan C. Monheit, Employer-SponsoredHealth Insurance and the Promise of
Health Insurance Reform, 46 INQUIRY 187, 195-96 (2009) (describing the positive outcomes of an
employer mandate in Hawaii).
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equivalents for more that 120 days in the preceding calendar year.32 These
employers need not offer or contribute to premiums for minimum benefits, but they
may choose to "play" by offering "minimum essential coverage" to full time
employees and their beneficiaries.33 Such coverage must meet minimum
requirements regarding the benefits themselves and be affordable; the employee's
required contribution cannot exceed 9.5% of total household income or 40% of
covered expenses. Automatic enrollment is required if the full-time workforce
equals 200 or more, although employees can opt out of coverage. 34
Because PPACA creates an incentive, not a mandate, there is no consequence
to a large employer that decides not to "play" unless and until one of its full-time
employees becomes a "free rider" by receiving federally subsidized health care
through a newly created, state-based health insurance exchange. Thus, a large
employer that offers no coverage pays nothing at all if none of its full-time
employees receives a federal premium credit or cost-sharing reduction to buy
exchange-based coverage. Should one or more of its full-time workers do so,
however, the employer will "pay" a stiff penalty in the form of a monthly excise
tax equal to:
(Number offull-time employees - 30) x ($2000112 or $166.67).3 5
It is important to note that the fine is based on all full-time employees (minus the
first 30), even if only one was a free rider. For an employer with 50 full-time
workers, this would amount to $40,000 per year. A full-time workforce of 100
would generate an annual penalty of $140,000.
Employers that do offer coverage could face somewhat lighter penalties if one
of its full-time employees receives a premium credit to buy exchange coverage.
Such employers will pay the lesser of:
(Number offull-time employees - 30) x ($2000112 or $166.67)
-or-

32. Full-time equivalents, as opposed to full-time employees (averaging thirty or more hours per
week, determined on a monthly basis) are used to determine whether an employer is large enough to be
subject to PPACA's "play or pay" requirements. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, § 1513(a) (2010) (amending 43 I.R.C. § 4980H) [hereinafter § 1513(a)]. However, only
full-time employees are counted when calculating the Act's "pay" penalties. Id. §§ 1513(a), 10106(e),
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 1 1-152, § 1003.
33. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1513(a). The content and scope of essential
benefits will be defined through future rule-making.
34. See generally THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: DETAILED SUMMARY 3

(2010), available at http://dpc.senate.gov/healthreformbill/healthbil195.pdf.
35. Id.
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(Number offull-time employees receivingpremium creditsfor exchange
converage)x ($3000112 or $250).36
There is no such penalty for employers that offer "free choice vouchers" that are
then used by the employee to participate in a health exchange. 37 After 2014, all
38
penalty amounts will be adjusted annually.
Given the inherent complexity of PPACA's original "play or pay" language
and subsequent reconciliation, its 2014 effective date, and the growing chorus of
critics vowing to repeal the Act or at least litigate much of it away, it is not at all
clear whether and to what extent employers will eventually play or pay. As
discussed infra, several states already have "play or pay" requirements and many
more were actively considering them, but put them on hold in the face of federal
reform efforts.39 Moreover, one month prior to PPACA's enactment, the U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL) submitted to the Office of Management and Budget a
proposed rule to "clarify the circumstances under which certain health care
arrangements established or maintained by state or local governments for the
benefit of non-governmental employees do not constitute an employee welfare
benefit plan" under § 505 of ERISA.40 Although the vague submission did not
mention "play or pay" provisions explicitly and might simply be intended to
address state health exchanges as opposed to mandatory contributions thereto, it
unleashed a torrent of criticisms from industry groups that the DOL was about to
exempt state or local fair share mandates from § 514 preemption. 4' The National
Benefits Council Steering Committee complained that the proposed rule "appears
to move in exactly the opposite direction" of PPACA's determination that "ERISA

36. Id.
37. PPACA requires large employers that offer coverage and pay a portion of its cost to provide
the alternative of free choice vouchers to those full-time employees with incomes below 400% of the
federal poverty level who would face an employee premium contribution of between 8% and 9.8%.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10108(hHi)
38. See generally HINDA CHAIKIND & CHRIS L. PETERSON, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV.,
SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL EMPLOYER PENALTIES UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTOIN AND AFFORDABLE

CARE AcT (PPACA) (2010), availableat http://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/EmployerPenalties.pdf.
39. See infra Parts III-VI.
40. Health Care Arrangements Established by State and Local Governements for NonGovernmental Employees, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,275, 64,275-76 (Dec. 7, 2009) (proposing to amend 29
C.F.R. 2510.3-1 pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1135).
41. See, e.g., HR Policy Ass'n, DOL Proposed Regulation Would Create ERISA Preemption
Carveout (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.hrpolicy.org/issues-story.aspx?GID=33&SID=3567&miid=3
&msid=4 (implying that the rule's timing was intended to influence the U.S. Supreme Court's expected
Fall 2010 resolution of Golden Gate Restaurant Ass "nv. City of San Francisco,546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir.
2008), petitionfor cert.filed, 130 S.Ct. 357 (June 5, 2009) (No. 08-1515), discussed infra Part V.C).
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should remain intact and preserve the protection against a patchwork of different
and conflicting municipal and state benefit plan requirements ....
,2
Of critical concern, therefore, is whether PPACA's "play or pay" measure
sets a minimum floor above which states can require more of employers or instead,
either immediately or as of 2014, preempts any state action along these lines.
Through its silence on such matters, the Act casts a large and threatening shadow
over the already perplexing impact of ERISA preemption on state health reform
efforts. Thus, as explained below, the chronic problem of inconsistent judicial
interpretation of ERISA preemption may now play an even larger role in derailing
state efforts to impose employer mandates and jeopardize those that are already in
existence.43
1I. A REVIEW OF ERISA's COMPLEX "PREEMPTION" CLAUSES
A. Section 514 's "Relate to " Clause
ERISA defines an "employee welfare benefit plan" as "any plan, fund, or
program.., established or maintained by an employer.., through [which] the
purchase of insurance or otherwise" provides various benefits, including health
benefits. 44 To protect plan administrators from the negative impact of unduly
complicated and potentially contradictory state regulations that foster plan
mismanagement and abuse, ERISA also contains a three-part preemption
provision.45 Section 514(a) states that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to an employee benefit plan
,46 Section 514(b) then exempts or "saves" from preemption
certain types of
state laws, including state insurance laws.47 Subsection (b) clarifies, though, that
states cannot "deem" a law to constitute insurance regulation for the purpose of
"saving" a law that would otherwise "relate to" a plan and trigger "relate to"
preemption. 8 Because § 514 is "not a model of legislative drafting," 49 each of its
three clauses will be considered separately in an effort to dispel at least some of
their inherent confusion.

42. Andrew Jensen, Fight Over ERISA Preemption Moves to Courts, Regulators, ALASKA J.
Apr. 9, 2010, http://www.alaskajournal.com/stories/040910/loc-13_001.shtml (quoting a
letter from the National Coalition on Benefits to Peter Orszag, Director of the Office of Management
and Budget, on March 15, 2010).
43. See infra Part II.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2006).
45. Id. § 1144(a), (b)(2)(A)-(B).
46. Id. § 1144(a). State laws subject to possible preemption "include[] all laws, decisions, rules,
regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State." Id. § 1144(c)(1).
47. Id. § I144(b)(2)(A).
48. Id. § l144(b)(2)(B).
49. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 722, 740 (1985).
COMMERCE,
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While § 514 supersedes a state law that "relates to" any employee benefit
plan, it does not explain that term. In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,5 ° the U.S.
Supreme Court offered the equally amorphous definition of having "a connection
with or reference to" an ERISA plan-as long as such claims are not "too
tenuous., 51 In theory, a law makes a "reference" to a plan if it explicitly mentions it
or depends on its existence. 52 A "connection" occurs when a statute does not
mention a benefits plan per se, but effectively regulates plans by restricting their
choices or creating the threat of conflicting state requirements. 3
For example, in New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
54
§ 514 did not preempt a generally applicable
Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,
New York surcharge on hospital bills because it affected plans only indirectly and,
therefore, did not target or regulate the plans themselves.5 5 Nevertheless, the Court
explained that "relate to" preemption can occur if such an indirect economic impact
"force[s] an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or
,,56
1
atrn
Apparently, altering a plan's
effectively restrict[s] its choice of insurers ....
incentives is fine, but dictating its choices is not.5 7
B. Section 514 's "Saving" and "Deemer" Clauses
A state law that relates to an employee benefit plan can still be "saved" from
preemption if it regulates health insurance. In Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v.
58

Moran,

an Illinois external review mandate for medical necessity determinations

concerning employer-sponsored coverage related to a plan, but survived § 514
59
preemption as a "saved" state insurance law. Reconciling § 514's broad "relate

to" preemption with its broad reservation of state insurance oversight has proved
difficult because "[w]hile Congress occasionally decides to return to the States

50. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
51. Id. at 96-97, 100 n.21.
52. See id. at 96-99 (stating that both the legislative intent and the Court's inclination are to read
the term "relate to" as broadly as possible so as to work toward the goal of complete federal preemption
of conflicting state laws).
53. See Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147 (2001) (stating that "'connection with' is scarcely
more restrictive than 'relate to' and that the Court will "look to 'the objectives of the ERISA statute as
a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress would survive,' as well as the nature of the effect of
the state law on ERISA plans").
54. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
55. Id. at 668 (basing its holding on the fact that the statute in question only indirectly affected
employee benefit programs and thus was not subject to ERISA preemption).
56. Id.
57. Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334
(1997) (holding that the statute in question "alter[ed] the incentives, but [did] not dictate the choices"
and thus was not related to an ERISA plan).
58. 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
59. 536 U.S. at 372-73. The "saving clause" exempts insurance, banking, or securities laws from
preemption. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2006).

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 13:393

what it has previously taken away, it does not normally do both at the same time. '' 6°
Further complicating matters is § 514's "deemer" clause, which qualifies the saving
clause that qualifies the "relate to" clause. 61 Basically, a state law cannot evade
"relate to" preemption simply by deeming a benefits plan as constituting an
insurance plan if it would not otherwise qualify as one. Although § 514 does not
define insurance, it is the reason why states can regulate insured, but not selfinsured plans-and also why firms increasingly self-insure to evade state
oversight.

62

As if § 514 were not sufficiently confounding, ERISA offers an additional
source and type of preemption through its § 502 civil enforcement scheme, which
actually says nothing about displacing state law.63 According to the Supreme Court,
however, § 502 is the sole means for enforcing ERISA and, thus, necessarily
preempts state claims that threaten ERISA's exclusive federal oversight of plan
administration. 64 Consequently, a state law that escapes § 514 "relate to" or
"conflict" preemption must also survive § 502 "complete" preemption. 65 Not
surprisingly, the textual complexity and ambiguity of § 514 and § 502 make this an
extremely unstable area of the law. Due to the Supreme Court's expansive
interpretations of both sections, § 514 preempted almost any state law that had any

66
impact on employee health benefits plans in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Preemption narrowed in the mid- 1990s 67 but recent years show the Court returning

60. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739-40 (1985); see also Rush Prudential,
536 U.S. at 392 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the "relate to" and "saving" clauses are "almost
antithetically broad").
61. § 1144(b)(2)(B). The "deemer clause" found in § 514 limits the "saving clause" by stating that
an employee benefit plan covered by ERISA "shall [not] be deemed to be an insurance company or
other insurer ...

or to be engaged in the business of insurance ...

for purposes of any law of any State

purporting to regulate insurance companies [or] insurance contracts ..... Id.
62. See id. § 1002 (lacking a definition of insurance); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61
(1990) (discussing application of the "deemer" clause to insurance regulation); Kathlynn L. Butler,
Comment, Securing Employee Health Benefits Through ERISA and the ADA, 42 EMORY L.J. 1197, 1204
n.41 (1993) (quoting Representative Wyden's statement that "[flirms that are too small to successfully
self-insure health plans are reorganizing to do just that, with the goal of escaping state oversight").
63. See § 1132 (omitting any explicit mention of preemption); Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The
Savings Clause, §f 502 Implied Preemption, Complete Preemption, and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 105, 110-11 (2001) (describing § 502 as an implied preemption).
64. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 52-53 (1987).
65. See Bogan, supra note 63, at 161-64 (discussing complete preemption and how it can convert a
state law claim for relief into a federal cause of action).
66. Lindsey Gastright Churchill, Note, Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran: Federal Intervention
Looms as Supreme Court Rules That ERISA Does Not Preempt State Laws Requiring Independent
Review of Medical Necessity Decisions and Lays Groundwork for Different Independent Review
Provisionsfrom All Fifty States, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 535, 564 (2002) (noting the court's trend of
broadly interpreting ERISA preemption in the 1980s and early 1990s).
67. See id. (noting that the Supreme Court moved away from its broad interpretation of preemption
after the early 1990s).
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to broad § 514 "relate to" or "conflict" preemption as well as § 502 "complete"
68
preemption.
III. STATE "PLAY OR PAY" MANDATES

ERISA does not require employers to offer health benefits, and prevents
69
states from mandating that they do so. At present, approximately 70% of private
sector employees are covered by commercially insured or self-funded employersponsored plans.7° With annual policy costs averaging $4,824 for individuals and

$13,375 for families, 7' some 40% of private sector employers choose not to provide
coverage.72 Over the past decade, 98% of large employers (i.e., employers with
73
greater than 200 workers) have continued to offer coverage, while the percentage
of small and mid-size firms (3 to 199 workers) offering coverage has dropped from
68% in 2000 to 59% in 2009.

74

Those that do offer health benefits contribute, on

average, 83% of the total premium for their workers' individual coverage and 73%

for family coverage. 75 According to one pre-PPACA estimate, whether through loss
76
of jobs or simply loss of benefits, 14,000 people become uninsured each day. This
places additional financial burdens on already cash-strapped, "safety net" hospital
emergency departments since most states only partially reimburse uncompensated

care by using Medicaid payment rates.77

68. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004) (holding that the state causes of
action fell within § 502 and were removable to federal court); Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539
U.S. 1, 8, 11 (2003) (applying complete preemption in allowing the removal of a case to federal court
even when the complaint relies entirely on state law). For an extensive discussion of how the U.S.
Supreme Court's inconsistent ERISA preemption jurisprudence has adversely affected health care in
general, see Mary Ann Chirba-Martin, Drawing Lines in Shifting Sands: The U.S. Supreme Court's
Mixed Messages on ERISA Preemption Imperil Health Care Reform, 36 NOTRE DAME. J. LEG. 91
(2010).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006) (indicating that benefit plans are not mandatory); id. § 1144 (stating
that ERISA supersedes any state laws that relate to employee benefit plans).
70. Press Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in the United States (July 28,
2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ebs2.nr0.htm.
71. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS: 2009 ANNUAL SURVEY 2 exhibit B (2009), availableat http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2009/7936.pdf
[hereinafter EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS 2009 SURVEY].
72. Id. at 38 exhibit 2.1.
73. Id. at 38 exhibit 2.2.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 68 exhibit 6.1.
76. CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, HEALTH CARE INCRISIS: 14,000 LOSING COVERAGE A
DAY 1 (2009), http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2009/02/pdf/health-care-_crisis.pdf.
77. See Teresa A. Coughlin & David Liska, Changing State and Federal Payment Policiesfor
MedicaidDisproportionate-ShareHospitals, 17 HEALTH AFF. 118, 119 (1998) (noting that hospitals are
only partially reimbursed for uncompensated care); Kevin N. Rask & Kimberly J. Rask, Public
Insurance Substituting for Private Insurance: New Evidence Regarding Public Hospitals,
Uncompensated Care Funds, and Medicaid, 19 J. HEALTH ECON. 1, 2-3 (2000) (noting that hospitals
are acting as a "safety net" for the uninsured).
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With federal reform efforts perennially stalled by congressional distraction
and gridlock in recent years, states looked for their own solutions, and focused
increasingly on the 40% of (mostly small) private sector employers that do not pay
their "fair share" for their employees' uncompensated care. Vermont and
Massachusetts have enacted "play or pay" requirements that, to date, have not been
challenged as preempted by ERISA.75 An additional fourteen states have attempted,
or are at least considering similar measures. 79 However, § 514's inherent
complexity and its inconsistent judicial interpretations have clearly had a chilling
effect on whether and how a state will pursue an employer mandate.80 Accordingly,
despite their promise as a way to expand and finance coverage, they have often
been viewed as not worth the substantial costs of defending them against ERISA
challenges.81
A. State Efforts to CreateEmployer "Play or Pay" Mandates
Prior to PPACA, a number of states attempted to work around ERISA in
trying to require or at least encourage employers to offer or contribute to employee
health coverage8 2 Most initiatives fell between inchoate ideas and near-final
proposals, but some were actually voted on.83 Of those, most were voted down, but
a few became law, including three that were challenged under § 514-with two
succumbing to preemption and a third probably on its way to a similar fate. 4

78. See infra Part V.
79. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., STATES
CARE REFORM
(2009),
available at
COMPREHENSIVE
HEALTH
MOVING TOWARD
http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/State-Health-Reform 1.pdf.
80. Cf Jane D. Bailey, ERISA Preemption, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 473, 486-87 (1997) (noting that
ERISA has proven frustrating to courts and is frequently litigated because of the complexity of the
statute); Rebecca Entigar Nauta, ERISA Preempts Maryland's Fair Share Health Care Fund Act: The
Chilling Effect on State Innovation in Health Care Cost-Sharing with Big Business, 35 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 756, 758 (2007) (predicting that judicial interpretation of § 514 cases, such as Retail Indus.
Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007), will have a chilling effect on state action in
encouraging employer-provided coverage).
81. See PATRICIA A. BUTLER, NAT'L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, ERISA IMPLICATIONS
FOR STATE HEALTH CARE ACCESS INITIATIVES: IMPACT OF THE MARYLAND "FAIR SHARE ACT" COURT

DECISION 7-8, 11 (2006) (describing the difficulty states will have in defending "play or pay" laws).
82. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 79, at 1-19 (noting states
that have attempted to enact differing health legislation despite the possibility of ERISA preemption);
Richard Cauchi, Nat'l Conf. of State Legs., States' Use of "Cafeteria Plans" to Provide Health
Insurance, http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=14515 (last visited June 11, 2010) (discussing state efforts to
require employers to offer health coverage through the use of cafeteria plans).
83. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supra note 79, at 5, 16, 18 (discussing
various state attempts at reform that have failed at different stages of the legislative process); id. at 3, 9,
15, 17 (noting that Colorado, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Vermont have all implemented initiatives to
expand health care access).
84. See infra Parts IV-V (discussing federal preemption in Maryland and New York and the
ongoing litigation in San Francisco).
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B. Proposalsand Initiatives
Oregon recently enacted a number of reforms to finance expanded coverage
by taxing hospitals and insurers. 85 However, ERISA concerns led it to defer
employer mandates for further study while urging Congress to "create 'safe harbor'
policies for state health care reform elements (such as 'play or pay' payroll taxes)
that would protect states from ERISA court challenges. 86
New York's Partnership for Coverage Initiative contains four reform
proposals modeled by the Urban Institute, with two relying on employer
mandates. 87 The Health Plus plan would offer a state-run plan as an alternative to
current employer sponsored private plans and levy non-capped payroll taxes of ten
percent. 88 A second proposal calls for as-yet-undetermined annual assessments on
employers with ten or more employees to be offset by an employer's other
contributions to employee health coverage. 89
In Pennsylvania, Governor Rendell's Prescriptionfor Pennsylvania would
impose a three percent "fair share tax" on the payrolls of employers that do not
offer health coverage to their workers. 90 A single payer proposal was recently filed
in the state legislature that included a "fair share tax" equal to ten percent of gross
payroll. 91
In early 2007, the Illinois Health Care for All Act9 2 came before the state's
General Assembly, but activity has since been suspended. 93 The Act would require
a "covered assessment" (a tax of three percent of annual wages up to a maximum of
$7500 per employee) from employers with ten or more employees "for the
85. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, supranote 79, at 15.
86. OR. HEALTH FUND BD., AIM HIGH: BUILDING A HEALTHY OREGON: FINAL REPORT 111 (2008),

available at http://www.oregon.gov/OHPPR/HFB/docs/Final-Report-112908.pdf. On June 26, 2009,
H.B. 2009 took effect as Chapter 595 (2009 Laws). H.B. 2009, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); Oregon
State Archives, Oregon Health Authority, http:l/arcweb.sos.state.or.us/rues/OARS_900/OAR_943/
943_001.html (last visited June 11, 2010).
87. COMM'R OF HEALTH & INS. SUPERINTENDENT, STATE OF N.Y. DEP'TS OF HEALTH & INS.,
REFORMS TO ACHIEVE QUALITY, AFFORDABLE COVERAGE FOR ALL NEW YORKERS 2, 5 (2009),
0 9
available at http://partnership4coverage.ny.gov/reports/docs/2 0 -07-17-release-ofLurban-institutereport.pdf.
88. Id. at 5.
89. Id.
90. FAMILIESUSA,

PENNSYLVANIA'S

2007

HEALTH

CARE

PROPOSAL:

PRESCRIPTION

FOR

PENNSYLVANIA 5 (2007), availableat http://www.farniliesusa.org/assets/pdfs/state-expansion-pa.pdf.
91. See H.R. 1660, 2009 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009) (describing single payer plan); S. 400,
2009 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009) (describing single payer plan).
92. S. 5, 95th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (II. 2007).
93. See Illinois General Assembly, Bill Status of SB0005, http:/www.ilga.govllegislation/
billstatus.asp?DocNum=5&DocTypelD=SB&GAID--9&SessionlD=51 (last visited June 11, 2010)
(noting suspension as of January 2009); see also John Bouman & Jennifer Hrycyna, Caro v.
Blagojevich: What Happens When Working Families' Health Care Becomes a Political Football, 42
CLEARINGHOUSE REV.: J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 615, 616 n. 11 (2009) (noting that the Illinois Senate
"never voted on the Illinois Health Care for All Act").
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privilege of doing business in [Illinois] ....
Employers spending 2.5% or more
of wages on health benefits could offset that amount with tax credits. 95 The bill
96
expressly precludes employers from collecting that amount from their employees.
In 2008, the New Mexico state legislature rejected the Health Solutions for
New Mexico Act.97 It would have required employers with as few as six employees
and eventually all employers to make "work force fund" contributions equaling the
difference between $500 per full-time worker (and $250 per part-time worker) and
9
any other payments toward employee health care that were less than $500 ($250). 8
Califomia's 2007 Health Care Security and Cost Reduction Act99 pursued
universal coverage by imposing "shared responsibility" on: 1) individuals to obtain
coverage; 2) the government to ensure the availability of affordable coverage,
including subsidizing coverage for those who could not otherwise afford it; and 3)
employers to offer § 125 cafeteria plans, and either "play" by covering their
workers directly or "pay" in the form of a state payroll tax.' 00 The nature and
amount of the employer mandate was the subject of extensive negotiations between
Governor Schwarzenegger and Democratic members of the state legislature.' The
final version called for a wage tax ranging from 1%to 6.5% depending on the size
of the firm's payroll. 10 2 After passing in the General Assembly, it quickly derailed
in the Senate Finance Committee once the non-partisan Legislative Analyst's
Office projected that, within five years, the plan's unstable financing mechanisms
and lack of cost controls could increase the state's already-mounting deficit by as
0 3
much as $1.5 billion.
IV. ERISA PREEMPTION

IN MARYLAND AND SUFFOLK COUNTY, NEW YORK

With an eye toward the threat of ERISA preemption, Maryland enacted an
extremely limited employer "play or pay" provision in its Fair Share Health Care

94. S. 5 §§ 50-301, -401.
95. Id. § 50-302.
96. Id. § 50-301(c).
97. H.R. 62, 48th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2008); KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED,

supra note 79, at 13.
98. H.R. 62 §§ 3, 12.
99. Assem. 1, 2007 Leg., 1st Extra. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
100. Id.
101. Jordan Rau, Some Steps, No Leaps on Healthcare;Legislators Vote to Curb Extreme Practices,
but Such Key Issues as Cost and Uneven Care Are Unaddressed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2008, at BI
(discussing the piece-meal manner of enacting health reforms because of aggressive lobbying).
102. Assem. I § 82(d).
103. Letter from Elizabeth G. Hill, Leg. Analyst, Leg. Analyst's Office, to the Hon. Don Perata,
Pres. Pro Tempore, Cal. Senate (Jan, 22, 2008), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/2008/hlth/
healthreform/healthreform._012208.aspx.
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Fund Act. 1°4 It applied to four employers with 10,000 or more workers, but
effectively targeted the only one that fell short of the statutory spending
requirement: Wal-Mart, which was already under fire for being the nation's largest
0 5

employer and failing to cover thousands of its employees.'

Maryland's new law

required Wal-Mart to meet various reporting requirements and devote at least eight
percent of its total payroll to employee health care expenses. 106 It could do the latter
by providing benefits directly or paying the difference between eight percent and its
current health expenditures to the state's Medicaid fund.'

07

Before the law could take effect, it was invalidated by the Court of Appeals
0 8
for the Fourth Circuit in Retail Industry Leaders Ass 'n v. Fielder' as being § 514
"relate to" preempted. 10 9 Wal-Mart itself did not sue; instead, the Retail Industry
Leaders Association (RILA) led the charge by arguing that the "fair share"
0
requirement violated ERISA's § 514 "relate to" clause.l" Maryland countered that
it was a generally applicable revenue statue like the one that survived § 514
preemption in Travelers."' The trial and appellate courts agreed with RILA,

104. Fair Share Health Care Fund Act, ch. 1, 2006 Md. Laws I (codified at MD. CODE ANN., LAB. &
EMPL. §§ 8.5-101 to -107 (West 2006), invalidated by Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d
180, 198 (4th Cir. 2007)); see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Maryland's "Wal-Mart" Act: Policy and
Preemption, 28 CARDozo L. REv. 847, 847-49 (2006) (providing general background on the impetus
for and content of Maryland's Fair Share Act).
105. See Andrew A. Green, Health Bill Is Up for Debate: At Conference, Firms Support Wal-Mart
Law Veto, Top Democrats Vow to Override It, BALT. SUN, Oct. 28, 2005, at IB (reporting that a WalMart official had acknowledged that criticisms about the company's health care policies were valid and
that many Wal-Mart employees were uninsured or receiving public assistance); Susan Parker, Editorial,
Our View-Fair Share Health Care Act, DAILY TIMES (Salisbury, Md.), July 23, 2006, at 12 (noting that
the law was known as the "Wal-Mart law" because it would have only impacted Wal-Mart); Ann
Zimmerman, Wal-Mart to Stock Emergency-Contraception Pill, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2006, at A6
("Wal-Mart faces rising criticism around the country for offering relatively bare-bones health benefits
for its workers."). At the time the Maryland law was enacted, three other companies employing more
than 10,000 workers operated in Maryland. Dan Rodricks, Politicians, Listen Up-The Public Has
Spoken, BALT. SUN, July 16, 2006, at lB. Wal-Mart was the only company of the four large employers
who did not already "pay [its] fair share or more." Id.
106. See MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-102 to -104 (requiring reports on health care
spending for qualified employers, and that eight percent of the sum of all total wages must be spent on
health insurance).
107. Id. § 8.5-104(b); see also Zelinsky, supra note 104, at 848-49 (discussing Maryland's Fair
Share Act).
108. 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 501 (D. Md. 2006), affd, 475 F.3d 180, 197-98 (4th Cir. 2007). Although
Maryland's bill never had legal effect, some suggest that it nevertheless compelled Wal-Mart to improve
the health care options it provided for its employees. Andrew A. Green, Wal-Mart Bill Is Celebrated,
Despite Ruling; Backers Say It PressuredRetailer to Improve Employee Health Plans, BALT. SUN, July
21, 2006, at l B.
109. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 197 (holding the Act has a "connection with" ERISA plans and,
accordingly, is preempted).
I10. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 485-86, 493-94 & n.13 (discussing RILA's standing and claim
before the court).
I 1l. Fielder, 475 F.3d at 195 (citing N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658-59 (1995)).
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reasoning that, despite the "pay" option, the eight percent spending provision was a
benefits mandate, and the reporting requirements interfered with plan
administration." 2 In each respect, the statute threatened § 514's goal of uniform
plan administration by requiring Wal-Mart to "keep an eye on conflicting state and
local minimum spending requirements and adjust its healthcare spending [and
recordkeeping] accordingly."" 3 Since this "connection" with a plan triggered
"relate to" preemption, the court saw no need to determine whether an improper
"reference" also existed. 1 4 Within the year, a similar fair share mandate (this time a
county ordinance) was preempted on similar grounds in Retail Industry Leaders
Ass 'n v. Suffolk County'15
V. WHAT REMAINS: MASSACHUSETTS, VERMONT, AND SAN FRANCISCOBUT FOR How LONG?

A. Massachusetts' "Health Carefor All" Statute
In drafting and negotiating the various bills that ultimately emerged as
PPACA, congressional leaders relied heavily on what Massachusetts had already
accomplished-and Massachusetts did so by deliberately avoiding Maryland's
narrow strategy. Massachusetts' Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality,
112. Id. at 194-95. For the trial court's reasoning as it relates to plan administration, see Fielder,435
F. Supp. 2d at 494-95.
113. Fielder,475 F.3d at 197; see also Fielder,435 F. Supp. 2d at 496 ("[T]he Act violates ERISA's
fundamental purpose of permitting multi-state employers to maintain nationwide health and welfare
plans ....");Matthew Dolan et al., Court Voids "Wal-Mart Law": U.S. District Judge Says Md.
Violated FederalAuthority, BALT. SUN, July 20, 2006, at 1A (indicating that Maryland's Fair Share Act
was invalidated by the Fourth Circuit because it violated federal law requiring uniform treatment of
employers by requiring Wal-Mart to submit reports regarding its health care expenditures while other
employers in the state were not so required); Editorial, The Wal-Mart Decision, BALT. SUN, July 21,
2006, at 12A (reporting that the limitations ERISA places on states' ability to regulate the benefit plans
offered by employers proved fatal to the legislation).
114. Fielder,475 F.3d at 192 n.2 (noting that neither the Circuit Court nor the District Court found it
necessary to reach the "reference" question as both courts found preemption through the "connection"
language). The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that the "reference to" standard applies more narrowly in
preempting state law. Id.
115. 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 416-17 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). With reporting obligations that mirrored
Maryland's, the ordinance again targeted Wal-Mart by requiring large, non-unionized retailers to make
annual health care expenditures equal to the "public health care cost rate" for each full- or part-time
employee. 1d. at 416; see SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., REGULATORY LOCAL LAW §§ 325-1 to -6 (Sept. 27,
2005), available at http://legis.suffolkcountyny.gov/resos2005/il903-05.htm (detailing annual reporting
requirements for covered employers); Ross Daly, Federal Judge Tosses Suffolk County's HealthCoverage Law, LONG ISLAND Bus. NEWS (Long Island, N.Y.), July 27, 2007 (reporting that a U.S.
District Court judge ruled that Suffolk County's fair share law was preempted by federal law and that
"[t]he arrival of Wal-Mart . .. was a motivating factor" for law's creation); Julia C. Mead, Suffolk
Requires Big Stores to Help with Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 28, 2005, at B5 (indicating that Suffolk
County's Fair Share for Health Care Act was aimed at retailers like Wal-Mart and noting that employers
covered by the law would be required to contribute a minimum of $3 for each hour worked to an
employee's health coverage).

2010]

ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE "PLAY OR PAY" MANDATES

409

Accountable Healthcare1 16 took effect in 2007 with the goal of achieving universal
coverage by 2009.117 Unlike Maryland's focus on getting Wal-Mart to play or pay,
Massachusetts foreshadowed PPACA's formulation of "shared responsibility" by
imposing an array of requirements on insurers, individuals, and certain
employers."18 For example, employers of more than ten full-time workers must
make a "reasonable contribution" to employee health care by: 1) providing health
benefits to at least twenty-five percent of the workforce; 2) paying at least a third of
the cost of all workers' individual plans; or 3) making an annual "fair share"
1 19
Firms must
contribution, which, in 2008, was up to $295 per full-time worker.
20
also offer § 125 cafeteria plans or face "free rider" penalties.' In Massachusetts,
then, employers can choose which type of payment to make, but some form of
payment is still mandated. This distinguishes it from PPACA's use of an incentive
that predicates the need to "pay" on the actual occurrence of free riding employees
(in terms of basic coverage as opposed to § 125 plans).

116. Act of Apr. 12, 2006, ch. 58, 2006 Mass. Acts, available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/
seslaw06/sI060058.htm.
117. See Richard Knox, Romney's Mission: Massachusetts Health Care (Apr. 8, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5330854 (noting the goal of the legislation is to
provide health insurance to virtually every citizen by 2009).
118. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 118E § 9A (West 2008); COMMONWEALTH CONNECTOR,
EMPLOYER HANDBOOK 1 (2007), available at https://www.mahealthconnector.org/portal/binary/
com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/Findlnsurance/Employer/Overview/
0
Employer /o2520Handbook.pdf ("The guiding principle behind this reform is one of shared
responsibility."). Located within the Massachusetts bill is the newly created Commonwealth Health
Insurance Connector, which assists individuals and small businesses with less than fifty employees to
find suitable private plans and promote consumer driven competition. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176Q
§ 1 (West Supp. 2009); COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., HEALTH CARE ACCESS AND AFFORDABILITY
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT 1 (2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/summary.pdf. To
date, the greatest criticism of the individual mandate is that it may not be economically sustainable since
it is feared that premiums will be too high for the insured, too low for the insurer, and therefore require
too much in the way of state subsidies. E.g., Alice Dembner, HealthcareCost IncreasesDominate Mass.
Budget Debate: Controlling Them Said Key to Keeping Universal Coverage, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26,
2008, at A12, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2008/03/26/healthcare cost_
increasesdominatemassbudgetdebate/?page=full.
119. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 188(b)-(d) (West Supp. 2009); see also COMMONWEALTH
CONNECTOR, supra note 118, at 2-3 (summarizing the statutory requirements).
120. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149 § 188; id. ch. 151F § 2; see also COMMONWEALTH
CONNECTOR, supra note 118, at 8 (explaining when the Free Rider Surcharge applies under the 26
U.S.C. § 125 plan). Free rider penalties, ranging from 10% to 100% of the cost of the services, for
failing to offer Section 125 plans to employees will be used to pay for uncompensated care sought by
that employer's workers on five or more occasions. See Robert E. Moffit & Nina Owcharenko,
Understanding Key Parts of the Massachusetts Health Plan, HERITAGE FOUND., Apr. 20, 2006,
available at http://www.heritage.org/ResearchlHealthCAre/wm1045.cfm. Because § 125 Plans permit
pre-tax employee contributions, they may offer savings of up to 40% of each employee dollar
contributed, saving employers about $160 in annual federal withholding tax for each participating
employee, despite the fact that it costs about $100 a year per employee to create and administer a healthonly cafeteria plan and that several national companies compete for this business. See Cauchi, supra
note 82.
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Initially, the cost of health reform in Massachusetts raised concerns that small
and medium-sized businesses would leave the state.' 21 A contravening worry was
that the fair share contribution was so low that it would lead employers to drop
coverage. 22 Initial data show that neither has occurred-at least not yet.
Approximately 70% of Massachusetts employers offered health benefits from 2001
through 2005.123 Notwithstanding escalating costs, this figure rose to 72% when the
employer mandate took effect in 2007 even though nationally, employer coverage
fell from 68% in 2001 to about 60% in 2007.124
Massachusetts' health care reform law has attracted attention not only
because of its innovative approach, but also because of the broad political support
for its enactment. 125 That employers backed it from the start and continue to stand
by it is obviously essential to its financial sustainability. 126 However, employer
support is just as crucial for its "legal" sustainability insofar as it has escaped the
kinds of ERISA challenges that occurred in Maryland, Suffolk County, and, as
explained below, San Francisco.
For at least three reasons, however, Massachusetts' "play or pay" provision
has always been more vulnerable to § 514 preemption than its Maryland and
Suffolk County predecessors, and PPACA's enactment makes its longterm
prospects even more tenuous. First, Massachusetts' imposition of more
121. See Nina Owcharenko & Robert E. Moffit, The Massachusetts Health Plan: Lessons for the
States, BACKGROUNDER, July 18, 2006, at 7-8 (noting that the costs of an employer mandate could
make it difficult for the start-up and maintenance of small businesses); Ryan Menard, Bill Offers Family
Leave with Pay: Chamber, Union Leaders Differ on Plan;Employee Premiums Would Fund It, PATRIOT
LEDGER (Quincy, Mass.), Apr. 24, 2006, at 9 (voicing concern that businesses considering relocating to
Massachusetts might now look elsewhere).
122. See Jeffrey Krasner, Business Leader Suggests Health Law Too Easy on Firms, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 2, 2007, at Cl (noting that most employers provide a 50% to 80% premium contribution,
far more than the 33% required by the fair share plan to avoid assessments). To forestall such a result,
one bill has already been submitted that would exempt companies to pay for at least 50% of individual
premiums to avoid paying the $295 employee insurance fee. S. 661, 185th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass.
2007); Krasner, supra.
123. Div. OF HEALTH CARE FIN. & POL'Y, EXECuTIVE OFFICE OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
HEALTH CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS: KEY INDICATORS 4 (2009) (providing an overview of health care
statistics in Massachusetts, including data which shows that 68% to 70% of Massachusetts employers
offered health insurance to their employees in 2001, 2003, and 2005), available at
http://www.mass.govlEeohhs2/docs/dhcfp/r/pubs/09/key-indicatorsO2-09.pdf
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Gillian K. SteelFisher et al., Physicians' Views of the Massachusetts Health Care
Reform Law-A Poll, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. e39(l), e39(l) (2009), available at
http://content.nejm.org/cgi/reprintNEMpO9O985 I.pdf?ssource=hcrc (stating that U.S. policymakers are
looking to Massachusetts's health care plan as a potential model for health care reform).
126. See Robert J. Blendon et al., MassachusettsHealth Reform: A Public Perspectivefrom Debate
Through Implementation, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 28, 2008, at w556, w564 (reviewing a four stage public
opinion study that relayed information about the implementation and impact of the new health reform
law in Massachusetts); Press Release, Health Affairs, Massachusetts Businesses Express Support for
Health Care Reform Objectives: Survey Reveals Few Signs That Public Subsidies Are Crowding Out
Private Coverage (Nov. 14, 2007), available at http://www.healthaffairs.org/press/novdec0705.htm.
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requirements on all employers with eleven or more workers risks antagonizing far
more firms than just Wal-Mart. Second, the mandate to "pay something" through
coverage or an annual fair share contribution might be viewed as an effective
benefits mandate and/or administrative interference amounting to a § 514
preempted "connection" with a plan. Third, although the Internal Revenue Service
does not categorize § 125 plans as ERISA plans per se, their compulsory inclusion
may constitute a § 514 preempted benefits mandate and/or plan interference,
especially given their attendant financial and administrative costs. 127 In response to
an ERISA challenge, the state could argue that the law actually creates options, not
mandates, and that any payments make the law a funding measure with the kind of
indirect economic impact that evaded § 514 preemption in Travelers. Whether this
argument would prevail is unclear. Its failure in Fielder and Suffolk County and
early success in San Francisco's litigation 128 only underscores the unfortunate
reality that when it comes to ERISA preemption litigation, anything can happen.
So far, employers have not challenged Massachusetts' law but their support
may erode should health care costs, including fair share contributions and free rider
penalties, continue to climb. The fault lines may already be forming. Recent
budgetary constraints led the state to scale-back coverage for 30,000 legal
immigrants and reduce reimbursements for "safety net" hospitals. 129 This led
Boston Medical Center, the state's largest provider of uncompensated care, to sue
the state for violating its health reform statute, with more hospitals threatening to
do the same. 130 While not an ERISA case, it could be a sign of eroding support
among other stakeholders-including employers.

127. One analysis explains:
[B]ecause the definition of employer group health coverage is different under ERISA than
under the federal tax code, as long as employers do not endorse or promote specific
individually purchased health insurance policies, [§ 125 plans] . . . should not be subject to
ERISA. Nor should a state requirement that employers offer [§] 125 plans be preempted by
ERISA.
PATRICIA A. BUTLER, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., EMPLOYER CAFETERIA PLANS: STATES' LEGAL AND

POLICY ISSUES 2 (2008), availableat http://www.chcf.org/resources/download.aspx?id=%7bO973EF72-

1F9C-4985-8D60-DA35B418751E%7d. However, the National Conference of State Legislatures points
out that "states still cannot regulate 'self-insured' health plans sponsored by many large employers" and
that "[d]rafters need to recognize that care is needed to avoid a challenge to any broader law." Cauchi,
supra note 82.
128. See infra Part V.C.
129. Abby Goodnough, Massachusetts Takes a Step Backfrom Health Carefor All, N.Y. TIMES,
July 15, 2009, at A10; see also Carla K. Johnson, Will Safety Net Hospitals Survive Health Reform?,
ASSOCIATED PRESS FIN. WIRE, Sept. 8, 2009 (critiquing Massachusetts's decision to eliminate health

care coverage for legal immigrants in hopes of closing the state's growing deficit).
130. Wendy E. Parmet, Litigation Amidst Reform-The Boston Medical Center Case, 361 NEW ENG.

J. MED. 1819, 1819-21 (2009) (evaluating Boston Medical Center's recent challenge in state court
questioning Massachusetts's Medicaid reimbursement protocol).
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B. Vermont's "Catamount" Plan
Vermont's "Catamount" Plan,' 31 passed in 2006, also expects employers to
share the responsibility of financing universal coverage.' 32 Employers with
uninsured workers must make a quarterly health care premium contribution of $1
per day for each full time equivalent employee ($365 per year), but there are no
free rider penalties for noncompliance. 133 As in Massachusetts, Vermont's
mandatory employer contribution has not yet provoked an ERISA challenge, but it
may share the same vulnerabilities as the Massachusetts statute.
C. San Francisco'sMandate-A PreemptionSurvivor or Merely on Life Support?
Undaunted by the demise of Maryland and Suffolk County's fair share
mandates, San Francisco passed its own "play or pay" measure: the San Francisco
Health Care Security Ordinance. 34 It was immediately challenged but the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals surprisingly found no § 514 preemption in Golden Gate
35
RestaurantAss 'n v. City of San Francisco.'
The Ordinance applies to for-profit employers doing business in the city with
an average of twenty "covered" employees per quarter, as well as to nonprofit
employers that average fifty such workers. 136 These employers must make quarterly
"required health care expenditures" equal to the total number of hours paid for each
covered worker multiplied by an annual "health care expenditure rate.'

37

The City

131. Act of May 25, 2006, 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 190 (amending 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves
191).
132. See James Maxwell, Interview, Comprehensive Health Care Reform in Vermont: A
Conversation with Governor Jim Douglas, HEALTH AFF., Oct. 16, 2007, at w697, w699 (relaying the
Vermont governor's participation in and opinions on the state's comprehensive health reforms
implemented in 2006).
133. See Harry Chen, Representative, House Health Care Committee, Presentation at the Council of
State Governments: Eastern Regional Conference Annual Meeting: Vermont Health Care Reform
"Catamount Health" (Aug. 1, 2006), available at http://www.csgeast.org/Annual-Meeting/2006/
healthchen.ppt.
134. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 14.1-.8 (2006), available at http://library.municode.com/
=
index.aspx?clientld
4131 &stateld=5&stateName=California (follow "Chapter 14" hyperlink); see also
Groundbreaking City Health Care Plan Passes in S.F., SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (San Jose, Cal.), July
19, 2006 (detailing the history and unanimous passage of the Health Care Security Ordinance). The
Ordinance created a city-administered health care program called the Health Access Plan, now formally
entitled Healthy San Francisco but still referred to as HAP. Samuel C. Salganik, What the
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Can Teach Us About ERISA Preemption: Is It Possible to
Consistently Identify "Coercive" Pay-or-PlaySchemes?, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1504 & n.ISO. To
be eligible for HAP coverage, an employee must reside in the city, be uninsured, and have a low or
moderate income, although ineligible employees may be entitled to establish medical reimbursement
accounts with the City. S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 14.2(a)-(d).
135. 546 F.3d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 2008), petitionfor cert.filed, 130 S. Ct. 357 (June 5, 2009) (No.
08-1515).
136. § 14.1(b)(3), (I l)-(12) (defining covered employers).
137. Id. §§ 14.1(b)(2)-(12), .3(a). Covered employees must "(I) work in the City, (2) work at least
ten hours per week, (3) have worked for the employer for at least ninety days, and (4) are not excluded
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138

has a right to inspect the employer's quarterly expenditure records.
Noncompliance with recordkeeping requirements raises a presumption of
nonpayment that can only be rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 139 Under
certain circumstances, the spending requirement also applies to self-funded plans,
although they are exempt from tracking their per-employee expenditures. 140 The
early indications are that San Francisco's employer mandate has not produced job
losses and has reduced the number of uninsured from 82,000 to less than 23000.141

Mandating quarterly payments based on each worker's hours and variable
health expenditure rates, and requiring that quarterly records of those payments be
kept and made accessible is more burdensome than the fair share measures that
142
triggered § 514 "relate to" preemption in Fielder and Suffolk County.
Furthermore, § 514 has previously preempted potentially conflicting state and local
directives and here, this potential was already reality given Maryland's and Suffolk

from coverage by other provisions of the Ordinance." Golden Gate Rest. Ass "n,
546 F.3d at 644. At the
time of the Ninth Circuit's ruling, the per employee health care expenditure was $1.17 per hour for forprofit employers with twenty to ninety-nine employees and non-profit employers with fifty or more
employees, and $1.76 per hour for for-profit employers with 100 or more workers. Id. (citing OFFICE OF
LABOR STANDARDS

ENFORCEMENT, CITY & COUNTY OF S.F., REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING THE

EMPLOYER SPENDING REQUIREMENT OF THE SAN FRANCISCO HEALTH CARE SECURITY ORDINANCE

(HCSO) 13 (2007), availableat http://sfgsa.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid= 1246).
138. § 14.3(b)(i).
139. Id. § 14.3(b)(ii).
140. See Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n, 546 F.3d at 645 ("An employer providing 'health coverage to
some or all of its covered employees through a self-funded/self-insured plan' will 'comply with the
spending requirement . .. if the preceding year's average expenditure rate per employee meets or
exceeds the applicable expenditure rate' for the employer.").
141. Brief for Respondent at 6, Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City of San Francisco, No. 08-1515 (9th
Cir. Aug. 24, 2009); ARINDRAJIT DUBE ET AL., INST. FOR RESEARCH ON LABOR & EMPLOYMENT, THE
IMPACT OF SAN FRANCISCO'S EMPLOYER HEALTH SPENDING REQUIREMENT: INITIAL FINDINGS FROM

THE LABOR AND PRODUCT MARKETS 1-2 (2009), available at http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/cwed/
wp/sfhealth_09.pdf (indicating that the ordinance has not yet resulted in the substantial job losses some
worried might occur); Heather Knight, Health Plan Did Not Hurt City Jobs, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 21,
2009, at DI (reporting that, due to the ordinance, seventy-five percent of San Francisco's 60,000
previously uninsured residents now have access to health care).
142. Compare S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(a)-(b) (requiring a covered employer to "make
required health care expenditures .. .each quarter" and to "maintain accurate records of health care
expenditures, required health care expenditures, and proof of such expenditures made each quarter each
year, and allow OLSE reasonable access to such records"), with MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5103(a)(l) (West 2006) (requiring a covered employer to annually submit forms indicating the number of
people it employed, the amount spent by the employer on health insurance, and the percentage of payroll
the employer spent on health insurance), and SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y., REGULATORY LOCAL LAW
§ 325-3(E) (Sept. 27, 2005), available at http://legis.suffolkcountyny.gov/resos2005/il903-05.htm
(requiring an employer to "(1) maintain accurate records for each employee's... hours worked... ;(2)
permit employees . . . access to records . . . for inspection and copying; and (3) maintain accurate

records of the covered employer's health care expenditures each year").
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43
County's similarly intended, but differently designed "play or pay" mandates.
Thus, Golden Gate presented an even stronger case for preemption than had existed
in Maryland and Suffolk County.
Yet, a panel of three appellate judges from the Ninth Circuit saw things quite
differently. It reasoned that, as explained in Travelers, any preemption inquiry
should begin with a strong presumption against preemption, especially in an area
traditionally controlled by state law, such as health care.'" In its opinion, the
presumption prevails here, since the employer spending requirement has no
improper connection with an employee benefits plan, primarily because it provides
options for satisfying it. 145 Payments can be directed toward the benefits themselves
or be paid to the City. 14 6 Such a "meaningful alternative" protects employers from
having to establish or restructure existing plans, although they may elect to do
1 47
so.
Moreover, if an employer chooses to pay for benefits directly, the Ordinance
4
does not restrict how those dollars are used.1

According to the court, the "City-payment" option also shows that the
Ordinance does not mandate creation of an ERISA plan, 49 interfere with
administration of existing plans, 50 or bind plan administrators to particular
choices.1 5' Any administrative obligations fall on the employer, not the plan,
indicating that the Ordinance also fails to expose plans to the kind of conflicting
directives that ERISA preemption is designed to prevent.152 As a result, there is no
§ 514 preempted "connection."' 153 An impermissible "reference" to a plan is absent,
too, because the Ordinance neither targets ERISA plans nor depends on their
54
existence.
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit in Golden Gate found no conflict with the
Fourth Circuit's Fielder ruling. 5 5 The Ninth Circuit interpreted Maryland's "play
or pay" statute as forcing Wal-Mart to play since opting to pay the state returned

143. See Peter D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and
Limits, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 100 app. A (2009), for a side-by-side comparison of the Maryland
and San Francisco measures.
144. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n, 546 F.3d at 647 (citing N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 661 (1995)).
145. Id. at 655-57.
146. Id. at 655-56.
147. Id. at 646, 660.
148. Id. at 646-47.
149. Id. at 650.
150. Id. at 653-54.
151. Id. at 656.
152. Id. at 657.
153. Id. at 661.
154. Id. at 657.
155. Id. at 659.
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nothing but "lower employee morale and increased public condemnation."' 5 6 Under
this interpretation, Maryland's law related to plan administration in violation of §
514 because Wal-Mart's only "rational choice" was to play by establishing or
altering an ERISA plan. 157 In "stark contrast," San Francisco's City-payment option
offers "a meaningful alternative" to employers since their workers can enroll in the
City-run plan or establish medical reimbursement accounts with the City.1 5 8 The
court reasoned that this permits employers to fulfill the spending requirements
without having "to alter or establish ERISA plans .... "159
The Ninth Circuit denied the Restaurant Association's petition for en banc
review by the full panel of eighteen judges. 60 However, eight judges would have
reheard the case because they identified a circuit split with the Fourth Circuit in
Fielder and thought that Fieldergot it right. 161 In their view, the three judge Golden
Gate panel ran afoul of the Supreme Court's ruling in Egelhoff v. Egelhof' 62
because the Ordinance "effectively requires 'ERISA administrators to master the
relevant laws of 50 States' despite ERISA's insistence on uniform, federal
oversight of plan administration.' 63 The payment, record-keeping, and inspection
obligations forges "an impermissible connection with... ERISA plans" by directly
and indirectly affecting an employer's decisions regarding whether and how to
offer health benefits.' 64 A "reference" also exists since the Ordinance and its
regulations explicitly refer to employer plans and require employers to examine
their plans to calculate their expenditure obligations.1 65 Enforcing the Ordinance
additionally interferes with an employer's determination of its overall health
expenditures.166 Any one of these occurrences warrants § 514 preemption;
combined, they create an impermissible intrusion on employer autonomy and an
intolerable threat to ERISA's overall goal of nationally uniform plan
administration. Consequently, en banc review might have affirmed the trial court's
finding of § 514 preemption.
The Restaurant Association has petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for
certiorari. 67 As of April 2010, the Court had not formally granted review; however,
156. Id. at 659-60 (citing Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 193 (4th Cir. 2007)).
157. Id. (citing Fielder,475 F.3d at 193).
158. Id. at 660.
159. Id.
160. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 1000, 1001 (9th Cir. 2009).
161. Id. at 1004, 1006-07 (Smith, J., dissenting).
162. 532 U.S. 141 (2001).
163. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n, 558 F.3d at 1004 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at
149).
164. Id. at 1005.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1008-09.
167. Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 2008), petitionfor
cert.filed, 130 S. Ct. 357 (June 5, 2009) (No. 08-1515).
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68
in October 2009, it asked the U.S. Solicitor General to submit an amicus brief1
This allows the Obama Administration to endorse or reject the prior
administration's support for the Restaurant Association's unsuccessful preemption
argument before the Ninth Circuit. 69 There is no formal deadline for the Solicitor
General's brief, but the customary thirty-day response time has long since
passed. 70 This may reflect the political risks of taking a stand on this issue amid
the increasingly antagonistic push to enact health care reform in late 2009 through
March 2010, and an ongoing reluctance to do so given the fragile support for
17
PPACA's enactment.

It is always difficult to predict how the Court will rule in ERISA preemption
cases. Nevertheless, even before PPACA's enactment, and notwithstanding any
DOL efforts to exempt "play or pay" mandates from § 514's reach, 172 the Court
would probably have rejected the general objective of requiring employers to play
or pay as well as San Francisco's specific techniques for doing so. That it will do so
regardless of the Solicitor General's ultimate position in Golden Gate seems even
173
more likely given its April 2010 decision in Conkright v. Frommert.
Focused on the discretion owed to an ERISA plan administrator, the
Conkright case did not implicate § 514. However, it did lead Justice Roberts,
writing for a five to three majority, 174 to invoke the Court's 2002 preemption ruling
in Rush Prudential to emphasize that ERISA demands "a predictable set of
liabilities, under uniform standards of primary conduct and a uniform regime of
'
ultimate remedial orders and awards when a violation has occurred."175
The
Conkright majority refused to subject multi-state plans to "patchwork"
interpretations that "would introduce considerable inefficiencies in benefit program
168. Id.; see also Press Release, Office of the City Att'y, U.S. Supreme Court Asks Obama
Administration to Weigh In on "Healthy San Francisco" (Oct. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.sfcityattorney.org/index.aspx?page=218 (stating that, "[in calling for the views of Solicitor
General Elena Kagan, the Supreme Court has effectively postponed [its] decision" as to whether to grant
certiorari
in
Golden
Gate);
U.S.
Supreme
Court
Docket
for
No.
08-1515,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/docketfiles/08-1515.htm (last visited June 11, 2010) (indicating that no
response has yet been filed).
169. Bob Egelko, Top Court Requests Advice on S.F. Plan, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 6, 2009, at Al.
170. SUP. CT. R. 15(3), 37(2) ("Any brief in opposition shall be filed within 30 days after the case is
placed on the docket, unless the time is extended by the Court or a Justice .... ").
171. See Egelko, supra note 169 (discussing President Obama's struggle to overhaul health coverage
nationwide, and the central role that employer-based coverage plays in that debate). Others have
suggested that the Supreme Court harbors strong deference to Congress as far as ERISA is concerned,
and that any policy changes relating to the preemption issue must come from the legislature, not the
courts, for example, JACOBSON, supra note 1, at 11.
172. For a discussion of DOL's proposed amendment of 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-1 pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §
1135, see supra notes 40-41.
173. 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010).
174. The majority consisted of Justices Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito; Justice Breyer
dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsberg; Justice Sotomayor took no part in the decision. Id.
175. Id. at 1649 (quoting Rush v. Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355,379 (2002)).
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operation, which might lead those employers with existing plans to reduce benefits,
and those without such plans to refrain from adopting them."' 7 6 Quoting Egelhoff, it
stressed that "[ulniformity is impossible . . .if plans are subject to different legal

obligations in different States."'177 Such insistence on predictability, efficiency and
uniformity in plan administration makes it highly improbable that the Court will
tolerate exposing plans to varying "play or pay" requirements at the state and local
levels. This is especially true for large firms that are now covered by PPACA's
"play or pay" incentives. San Francisco remains undaunted, however, and actually
raised employer fair share contributions in April 2010.178
VI. THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYER MANDATES IN THE COURTS
In general, fair share measures usually apply to employers instead of their
benefits plans in order to avoid § 514 preemption. The Supreme Court will
probably

dismiss this as an impermissible attempt to circumvent preemption

through artful legislative drafting. Fair share laws, especially those that mandate

some form of payment as Massachusetts and San Francisco do, could also fail for
effectively forcing employers to establish or alter benefits plans, or fund public
sources of coverage, whether for their own workers or a general pool. As explained
in Egelhoff, § 514 preempts forced or restricted administrative choices, regardless
of any benefits that might accrue from those choices. 7 9 Consequently, in Golden
Gate, the "pay" option's quid pro quo-allowing employees to enroll in San
Francisco's plan or set-up medical reimbursement accounts-may have impressed
the Ninth Circuit as influencing without dictating plan choices, but is unlikely to
sway the Supreme Court. Additionally, certain types of mandates may be especially
vulnerable to "relate to" preemption despite their effort to avoid it.
For instance, payroll taxes were chosen by Maryland and San Francisco as
their "pay" option, and are appealing since employers already face an array of
federal, state, and local taxes.' 80 To date, varying tax liabilities have not qualified
as § 514 preempted conflicting state directives. 181 Given public disdain for new

176. Id. (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11(1987)).
177. Id. at 1651 (quoting Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001)).
178. See Erin Sherbert, Healthy SF Fees Set to Increase, S. F. EXAMINER, Apr. 23, 2010, available
at http://www.sfexaminer.com/localVHealthy-SF-fees-set-to-increase-91887114.html (noting that fees
for employers with twenty to ninety-nine workers will increase in 2011 from $1.31 to $1.37 per hour,
and, for 100 or more workers, will increase from $1.96 to $2.06).
179. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 146-47.
180. MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 8.5-103(a)(1)(iii) (West Supp. 2006), invalidated by Retail
Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007); S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(a)
(2006), available at http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientld=14131 &stateld=5&stateName =
California (follow "Chapter 14" hyperlink).
181. See, e.g., De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund., 520 U.S. 806 (1997). In De
Buono, the Court considered whether ERISA preempted New York from imposing a gross receipts tax
on the income of medical centers operated by ERISA funds. Id. at 808-09. The Court held that ERISA
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taxes, state and local legislators may prefer the term "contribution" to "tax," but the
latter would be the wiser choice if trying to avoid preemption. A tax also holds the
advantage of arguably creating an indirect financial incentive regarding the
existence and structure of a plan as permitted in Travelers. However, Travelers
stated that even indirect financial incentives will be preempted if they effectively
bind the plan's choices. 82 Section 514 preemption occurred in Egelhoff, where the
only "choice" was to comply with state law or alter the benefits plan.' 83 Since this
is also true for "play or pay" mandates,' 84 the Supreme Court will probably
characterize a public-pay option as preempted under § 514 as a restriction of plan
choice.
Flat fees-a variant of the "pay" option such as the per capita, annual
"contribution" enacted in Massachusetts and proposed in California's failed state
reform effort-present other problems. California had initially pegged the
contribution to cover workers at firms opting to pay the state in lieu of paying for
health care directly. 85 Because this seemed too close to a benefits mandate
preempted under § 514, the contribution was redirected to a general pool. 186 The
advantage of an annual flat fee is that it is less administratively burdensome than
the ongoing calculations needed to satisfy a quarterly payroll tax. 18 7 There is still a
problem though since, as in Egelhoff, the only alternative to making the mandated
contribution is to offer health benefits that meet the statutorily required minimum
coverage. 88 This is particularly concerning where employers that neither play nor
pay face "free rider" penalties, as they would in Massachusetts.' 89 That this penalty
did not preempt the New York tax law and reasoned that the tax was "one of 'myriad state laws' of
general applicability that impose some burdens on the administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless
do not 'relate to' them within the meaning of [ERISA]." Id. at 815. The Court further noted that "[a]ny
state tax, or other law, that increases the cost of providing benefits to covered employees will have some
effect on the administration of ERISA plans, but that simply cannot mean that every state law with such
an effect is pre-empted by the federal statute." Id. at 816.
182. N.Y. State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 664
(1995).
183. Egelhoff,532 U.S. at 150-51.
184. Fielder,475 F.3d at 183.
185. See generally Rick Curtis & Ed Neuschler, Affording Shared Responsibility for Universal
Coverage: Insights from California, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 24, 2009, at w417, w420-29 (analyzing key
features from California's latest experience in working towards developing a plan for universal health
coverage with a "shared responsibility" framework between individuals, employers, and state
govemmentalities).
186. See id. at w425-26 (noting that the contributions were used as credits against money the
employer owed to the state).
187. See Rick Curtis & Ed Neuschler, Designing Health Insurance Market Constructsfor Shared
Responsibility: Insights from California, HEALTH AFF., Mar. 24, 2009, at w431, w437-38 (noting that
fees only require a majority vote, while taxes require a two-thirds vote for enactment).
188. Cf Egelhoff,532 U.S. at 147.
189. See Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Andres Torres, Universal Health Care in Massachusetts:
Setting the Standardfor National Reform, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 409, 440 (2008) (discussing several
implications that the Massachusetts "free rider" penalties imposes on employers).
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attaches only when an uncovered worker uses uncompensated care under certain
conditions does not erase the concern; it is the restriction of choice and intrusion on
administration that is the problem, not the dollar amount involved. Thus, § 514 may
preempt a flat fee as an improper interference with plan administration.
A novel approach is Illinois's proposed "privilege to employ" fee, which
would require covered employers to pay a flat fee each year for the privilege of
hiring each worker. This might survive § 514 preemption if the fee applies without
regard to the extent of the employer's health care expenditures. This completely
divorces the mandated payment from plan design and administration even though
the resulting revenues could be used to finance expanded coverage.' 90 Nevertheless,
Illinois' proposed fee might undermine the basic purpose of fair share mandates by
doing little to encourage the creation of new benefits plans, leading some firms to
curtail or drop existing coverage.
Recording and reporting requirements used to monitor and enforce "play or
pay" provisions may trigger preemption problems, too. PPACA requires large
employers to submit annual reports to the Treasury Department stating whether it
offers coverage to full-time employees and, if so, whether waiting periods applied,
how many workers were covered during each month, along with the name, address
and tax identification number of each such employee and their months of
coverage. ]9' State and local "shared responsibility" intiatives typically impose
recording and reporting obligations, too, although differing on the content and
timing of reports.'

92

States will argue that § 514 preemption is not implicated since merely
recording and reporting in no way interferes with the processing or payment of
benefits claims per se.193 According to Egelhoff, however, "[r]equiring ERISA
administrators to master the relevant laws of 50 States" regarding plan design and
administration jeopardizes ERISA's goal of national uniformity and efficient plan
state and local "play or pay" mandates is
administration.! 94 As such, this future of
195
clearly threatened by § 514 preemption.

190. Compare S. 5, 95th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 50-301 (1].2007) (imposing a flat fee regardless
of employer expenditures on health care), with Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180,
195-97 (4th Cir. 2007) (striking down Maryland's "play or pay" legislation, which mandated payment
depending on the level of employee coverage).
191. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10108.
192. For a discussion of varying requirements of Maryland, Suffolks County, and San Francisco, see
supra Parts IV-V.
193. Cf Minn. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Minn. Dep't of Labor &
Indus., 866 F. Supp. 1244, 1247 (D. Minn. 1993) ("The requirements of calculating costs and keeping
records may somewhat increase the cost of the benefits plans, but this incidental impact on the plans
need not lead to preemption.").
194. Egelhoffv. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 149-50 (2001).
195. See id. at 150 (suggesting that complying with different state recording and reporting
requirements might cause a lack of uniformity that ERISA preemption was intended to avoid).
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Cafeteria plans under § 125 of the Internal Revenue Code allow employees to
pay for health care with pre-tax dollars, while permitting employers to reduce their
FICA withholdings by about $160 per participating employee. 196 Under federal
law, § 125 cafeteria plans are entirely optional for employers and do not qualify as
ERISA benefit plans. 197 States have been increasingly attracted to § 125 plans since
they may lower employer and employee costs and expand coverage without
violating § 514.198 As of May 2009, five states require employers to offer cafeteria
plans: Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, and Rhode Island. 199
Seven states do not require, but encourage them through employer incentives:
Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Tennessee, and Washington. 2°° During the
2009 legislative session, another six considered, but did not pass § 125 mandates:
20 1
Alaska, California, Kansas, Mississippi, New Jersey, and Oklahoma.
Relatively speaking, however, § 125 mandates and incentives have been
easier to enact than "play or pay" mandates, largely because they are often viewed
as more likely to survive "relate to" preemption. 202°2 Yet, even though cafeteria plans
are not themselves ERISA plans, mandating their creation could violate § 514's
explicit ban on state benefits mandates. While simpler to set up and operate than
direct benefits plans, § 125 plans still entail administrative costs in terms of both
time and money. An employer may realize some $160 per employee savings in
FICA withholdings, but may also spend about $100 per employee to create and
administer a health-only cafeteria plan.20 3 Conceivably, then, the Supreme Court
could decide that the logistics of having to do so in one state but not in another may
interfere with the national uniformity that ERISA is determined to preserve. 204

196. Cauchi, supranote 82.
197. Id. However, PPACA prohibits an employee from using pre-tax § 125 contributions to purchase
coverage through a health exchange. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1515(a) (amending
26 U.S.C. § 125(f)(3)).
198. Cauchi, supra note 82.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. None of these six states passed the legislation in 2009. See S. 61, 26th Leg., 2009-10 Reg.
Sess. (Alaska 2010) (referred to Labor & Commerce Committee); S. 594, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2010) (returned to the Secretary of the Senate); S. 2262, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2010)
(referred to Appropriations Committee); H.R. 573, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009) (referred to
Insurance Committee); Assem. 2283, 2008-09 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2009) (withdrawn from
consideration); H.R. 1034, 2009-10 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2010) (referred to Appropriations & Budget
Committee). Of these states, however, each has proposed similar legislation in 2010, with Mississippi
being the only state to pass the legislation. S. 2554, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2010).
202. Compare Cauchi, supra note 82 (listing thirteen states that successfully use either mandatory or
optional § 125 plans), with Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 197 (4th Cir. 2007),
and Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Suffolk County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 416-17 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(invalidating "play or pay" mandates as being § 514 "relate to" preempted).
203. Cauchi, supra note 82.
204. See, e.g., Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148-49 (2001) ("One of the principal goals of
ERISA is... to establish a uniform administrative scheme ....
(quotations omitted)).
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Regardless of the wisdom of federal health reform in general and "play or
pay" measures in particular, passing either, let alone both through PPACA was an
epic political accomplishment. Perhaps it is because Congress is so deeply divided
and voting blocks are so fragile that PPACA uses a "play or pay" incentive instead
of a mandate. This may also explain why the statute's employer responsibility
language says nothing about ERISA or PPACA itself preempting states from
requiring more in terms of minimum benefits or fair share contributions.
Massachusetts, for instance, does require more in terms of employers covered
(eleven or more full-time workers in contrast with PPACA's requirement of fifty)
and payments (mandatory fair share contributions of some kind as opposed to
2 °5
Thus, the
PPACA's imposition of penalties only if free-riding actually occurs).
courts are left to divine whether Congress intended PPACA (either independently
or in conjunction with ERISA) to preempt similar state mandates or merely set a
minimum floor. Failing to clarify this jeopardizes the gains in covering workers at
°6
small firms already realized in Massachusetts and Vermont.2 Since the early U.S.
House and Senate proposals and the final version of PPACA leave § 514
preemption intact, most courts would probably find that a federal employer
mandate would preempt comparable state measures, but others could differ just as
they have in handling the endless array of preemption battles over the past three
decades .207
Amidst all of these uncertainties, one thing remains clear: PPACA may have
drastically increased the federal government's role in overseeing health care, but
even 2000 page bills 208 leave more than enough for the states to do. PPACA's
heavy reliance on what Massachusetts had already done without addressing
preemption head-on can cut both ways. Arguably, Congress intended § 1513's
"play or pay" provision to peacefully co-exist with Massachusetts' and San
Francisco's more rigorous requirements. Alternatively, § 1513's clear differences
signal a rejection and displacement of the their approach. Such competing scenarios
make Congress' avoidance of the preemption question not only confusing, but
inexcusable. Thus, it must clarify when and to what extent § 514 preempts state
reform initiatives in general and employer mandates in particular. Otherwise, as
Congress' long awaited and hard-fought response to an intractable national crisis,
PPACA will have made the ever-confounding area of ERISA preemption even
more impenetrable simply by saying nothing about it.

205.
206.
207.
208.

Compare Parts I, V.
Id.
See supra Part II.
See, e.g., H.R. 3962, 11 1th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); H.R. 3590, 11 1th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).

